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LEGAL AND ETHICAL PRECEPTS GOVERNING EMERGING MILITARY
TECHNOLOGIES: RESEARCH AND USE
George R. Lucas, Jr.*
From the emergence and increasing use of unmanned or remotely piloted
vehicles to the advent of cyber war and conflict, the development of new and
exotic military technologies has provoked fierce and divisive public debate
regarding the ethical challenges posed by such technologies.1 I have increasingly
come to believe that the language of morality and ethics has served us poorly in
this context and presently serves to further confuse us, rather than to clarify or
enlighten us, on how best to cope with the continuing development and
deployment of seemingly exotic new military technologies.
There are numerous reasons that justify this concern. Segments of the public
involved in these discussions harbor distinctive and incompatible—and sometimes
conceptually confused and unclear—notions of what “ethics” entail. From
individual and culturally determined intuitions regarding morally right conduct,
through the achievement of beneficial outcomes, all the way to equating ethics to
mere legal compliance, this discord results in frequent and virtually hopeless
equivocation. Moreover, many scientists and engineers (not to mention military
personnel) tend to view the wider public’s concern with ethics as misplaced and
regard proponents of ethics as little more than technologically and scientifically
illiterate, fear-mongering, nay-saying Luddites who simply wish to impede the
progress of science and technology.
Why insist on invoking fear and mistrust and posing allegedly moral
objections to the development and use of unmanned systems, instead of defining
clear engineering design specifications and operational outcomes that incorporate
the main ethical concerns? Why not require engineers and the military to design,
build, and operate to these standards if they are able, and otherwise to desist until
they succeed? Why engage in a science-fiction debate over the future prospects for
artificial-machine intelligence that would incorporate analogues of human moral
cognition when what is required is far more feasible and less exotic: machines that
function reliably, safely, and fully in conformance with applicable international

* © 2013 George R. Lucas Jr., Professor of Philosophy & Public Policy, Global
Public Policy Academic Group, Naval Postgraduate School; Distinguished Chair in Ethics,
Stockdale Center, U.S. Naval Academy. A similar version of this Article is being published
by the Amsterdam Law Forum.
1
See, e.g., ARMIN KRISHNAN, KILLER ROBOTS: LEGALITY AND ETHICALITY OF
AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 117–44 (2009); P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR 382–412 (2009);
George R. Lucas, Jr., Postmodern War, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 289, 289–98 (2010); George R.
Lucas, Jr., “This Is Not Your Father’s War”—Confronting the Moral Challenges of
“Unconventional” War, 3 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 329 (2009).
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laws—such as the law of armed conflict (LOAC)—when operating in wartime?2
And why insist that the advent of cyber conflict is a “game changer” that ushers in
a new mode of unrestricted warfare in which all the known laws and moral
principles of armed conflict are rendered obsolete,3 when what is required by this
development is merely the application of appropriate analogical reasoning to
determine how the known constraints extrapolate to these novel conditions?4
In this Essay, I propose the initial outlines of a framework for identifying and
fostering productive debate over the acceptable ethical boundaries regarding novel
technologies. First, I survey the state of discourse surrounding the ethics of
autonomous weapon systems and cyber warfare. Next, I discuss how attempting to
codify the emerging consensus on ethical boundaries for a given technology can
focus the conversation on unsettled areas more effectively than vague moral
discourse. Finally, I offer a set of precepts for the development and operation of
autonomous systems and invite discussion on their accuracy and degree of
comprehensiveness. I suggest how this methodology, and many of these precepts,
applies to the regulation and governance of other military technologies as well.
I. ETHICAL DEBATE OVER NOVEL TECHNOLOGIES
Three recent and prominent threads of discussion serve to illustrate the ethical
debate over the use and development of novel technologies: first, the ArkinSharkey debate over the proposed benefits and liabilities of “machine morality” as
part of the larger, seemingly relentless drive toward developing ever-greater
degrees of autonomy in lethally armed unmanned systems;5 second, the efforts on
the part of members of the International Committee on Robot Arms Control
(ICRAC)—led by Peter Asaro, Robert Sparrow, and Noel Sharkey—to outlaw the
future development of autonomous lethally armed unmanned systems under
international law;6 and third, the identification of areas of emerging consensus or
agreement among the contending stakeholders regarding the role of ethics in cyber
warfare. This third debate centers on the development of cyber weapons and
tactics, both those aimed indiscriminately at civilian personnel and “objects” such
as vital civil infrastructure, and highly discriminate cyber weapons like Stuxnet
2

See George R. Lucas, Jr., Engineering, Ethics, & Industry: The Moral Challenges of
Lethal Autonomy, in KILLING BY REMOTE CONTROL: THE ETHICS OF AN UNMANNED
MILITARY 211, 217–21 (Bradley Jay Strawser ed., 2013).
3
See Randall Dipert, The Ethics of Cyber Warfare, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 384, 394–95
(2010).
4
See George R. Lucas, Jr., Jus in Silico: Moral Restrictions on the Use of
Cyberwarfare, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ETHICS AND WAR: JUST WAR THEORY IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 367, 368–71 (Fritz Allhoff et al. eds., 2013).
5
See Ronald C. Arkin, The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems, 9 J.
MIL. ETHICS 332, 332–34 (2010); Noel Sharkey, Saying ‘No!’ to Lethal Autonomous
Targeting, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 369, 376–81 (2010).
6
See Who We Are, INT’L COMMITTEE FOR ROBOT ARMS CONTROL, http://
icrac.net/who/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
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and Flame that may be used in a preemptive or preventive fashion against
perceived threats that have resulted in no actual harm, as yet, inflicted by the
recipient of the cyber attack.7
These three examples do not exhaust all of the features of the wider debate
over emerging military technologies, by any means. The increasing array of socalled nonlethal weapons, for example, involves questions about the use of such
weapons on noncombatants and the potential of such weapons to expand the rules
of engagement for use of force, rather than lessening the destruction or loss of life
as compared to the current regime.8 Prospects for military uses of nanotechnology
raise specters of weapons and systems that might cause widespread and
catastrophic collateral or environmental destruction.9 And efforts to use biological,
neurological, and pharmaceutical techniques to enhance the capabilities of human
combatants themselves raise a host of ethical questions. Such questions range from
topics like informed consent for the use of these techniques, to the likely long-term
health prospects for enhanced individuals following their military service, to the
potentially undesirable social conflicts and transformations (i.e., “civilian
blowback”) that such techniques might inadvertently bring about.10 For the present,
however, I will stick to the three illustrations above because they collectively
encompass a great deal of the public debate over military technology, and the
lessons learned in response have a wider applicability to these other areas and
topics as well.
First, the prospects for machine models of moral cognition constitute a
fascinating, but as yet futuristic and highly speculative enterprise. The goal of
7

See DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL: OBAMA’S SECRET WARS AND
SURPRISING USE OF AMERICAN POWER 188–209 (2012) (providing a retrospective account
of the “Olympic Games” project to deploy the Stuxnet worm against Iranian nuclear
facilities); George R. Lucas, Jr., Permissible Preventive Cyber Warfare, in THE ETHICS OF
INFORMATION WARFARE (Luciano Floridi & Mariarosaria Taddeo eds., forthcoming 2013)
(giving a preliminary summary of the discovery and strategic implications of the Stuxnet
worm against the backdrop of three prior conflicts in Estonia, Syria, and Georgia in 2007
and 2008).
8
See, e.g., Paula Kaurin, With Fear and Trembling: An Ethical Framework for
Nonlethal Weapons, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 100, 100–02 (2010).
9
See, e.g., James J. Hughes, Global Technology Regulation and Potentially
Apocalyptic Technological Threats, in NANOETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 201, 201–04 (Fritz Allhoff et al. eds., 2007)
(discussing the environmental threat of “grey goo” or unrestrained self-replicating
nanotechnologies); Ray Kurzweil, On the National Agenda: U.S. Congressional Testimony
on the Societal Implications of Nanotechnology, in NANOETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY, supra, at 40, 44–47 (providing examples of
true nanotechnology such as the military’s development of “smart dust,” which consists of
millions of nanodevices dropped on enemy territory to provide detailed surveillance).
10
See PATRICK LIN ET AL., ENHANCED WARFIGHTERS: RISK, ETHICS AND POLICY 11–
27, 66–76 (2013), available at http://ethics.calpoly.edu/Greenwall_report.pdf (providing an
account of enhancement technologies and their prospective military uses and potential
abuses).
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developing working computational models of reasoning, including moral
reasoning, is hardly impossible, but the effort required will be formidable.11
“Morality” and moral deliberation remain firmly in the domain of human
experience for the foreseeable future. In any event, discussions of ethics and
morality pertaining to unmanned systems at present are largely irrelevant. We
neither want nor need our unmanned systems to be ethical, let alone more ethical
or more humane than human agents. We merely need them to be safe and reliable,
to fulfill their programmable purposes without error or accident, and to have that
programming designed to conform to relevant international law (such as the
LOAC) and specific rules of engagement (ROEs). With regard to legal
compliance, machines should be able to pass what is defined below as the modified
“Arkin test”: autonomous unmanned systems must be demonstrably capable of
meeting or exceeding behavioral benchmarks set by human agents performing
similar tasks under similar circumstances.12
Second, proposals at this juncture to outlaw research, development, design,
and manufacturing of autonomous weapons systems seem at once premature, ill
timed, and ill informed—classic examples of poor governance. Such proposals do
not reflect the concerns of the majority of stakeholders who would be affected;
they misstate, and would attempt to overregulate relevant behaviors.13 Ultimately,
11

The degree of futuristic speculation involved in such efforts is indicated in the
Arkin-Sharkey debate. See Arkin, supra note 5; Sharkey, supra note 5; see also RONALD
ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS 93–113 (2009) (giving a
proponent’s account of the formidable challenges entailed in such efforts); Ronald Craig
Arkin et al., Moral Decision Making in Autonomous Systems: Enforcement, Moral
Emotions, Dignity, Trust, and Deception, 100 PROC. IEEE 571, 572–86 (2012) (providing
an account of the progress on such efforts to date).
12
This criterion—that robots comply as, or more, effectively with applicable
constraints of LOAC on their use of force and doing of harm than human combatants under
similar circumstances—constitutes what I have termed the “Arkin Test” for robot
“morality” (although that is likewise somewhat misleading, as the criterion pertains
straightforwardly to compliance with international law, not with the exhibiting of moral
judgment). In this sense, the test for “morality” (i.e., for the limited ability to comply with
legal restrictions on the use of force) is similar to the “Turing Test” for machine
intelligence: we have satisfied the demand when machine behavior is indistinguishable
from (let alone better than) human behavior in any given context. See George. R. Lucas,
Jr., Industrial Challenges of Military Robotics, 10 J. MIL. ETHICS 274, 281 (2011); see also
Robert Sparrow, Building a Better Warbot: Ethical Issues in the Design of Unmanned
Systems for Military Applications, 15 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 169, 177–78 (2009)
(explaining the need to design systems capable of complying with LOAC).
13
In addition to proposals to outlaw armed or autonomous military robotic systems by
ICRAC itself, a recent report from Human Rights Watch makes similar recommendations.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 5
(2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_
0.pdf. While unquestionably well intentioned, the report is often poorly or incompletely
informed regarding technical details and highly misleading in many of its observations.
Furthermore, its proposal for States to collaborate in banning the further development and
use of such technologies would not only prove unenforceable but likely would impede
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such regulatory statutes would prove unacceptable to, and unenforceable against,
many of the relevant parties (especially among nations or organizations with little
current regard for international law), and would thus serve merely to undermine
respect for the rule of law in international relations. Machines themselves (lacking
the requisite features of folk psychology, such as beliefs, intentions, and desires)
by definition cannot themselves commit war crimes, nor could a machine be held
accountable for its actions. Instead, a regulatory and criminal regime, respecting
relative legal jurisdictions, already exists to hold accountable individuals and
organizations that might engage in reckless or criminally negligent behavior in the
design, manufacture, and ultimate use of unmanned systems of any sort.14
Lastly, in contrast to robotics, which has spawned tremendous ethical debate
but little in the way of jurisprudence, discussions of the cyber domain have been
carried out almost entirely within the jurisdiction of international law,15 with very
sparse comment from ethicists until quite recently.16 Some have found the threat of
a grave “cyber Armageddon”—of the sort predicted by Clarke and Brenner17—
somewhat exaggerated. These commentators have even denied that the genuine
equivalent of armed conflict has or could likely occur within this domain: no one
has yet been killed, nor have objects been harmed or destroyed, in a cyber
conflict.18 What has transpired instead is an increase in “low-intensity” conflict,
such as crime, espionage, and sabotage, which blurs the line between such conflict
and war and results in cumulative harm greater or more concrete than damage
other kinds of developments in robotics (such as the use of autonomous systems during
natural disasters and humanitarian crises) that the authors themselves would not mean to
prohibit. It is in such senses that these sorts of proposals represent poor governance.
14
Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots,
12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 272, 300–05 (2011).
15
See MICHAEL SCHMIDT ET AL., THE TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 15–41 (2012), available at https://www.ccdcoe.org/
249.html; see also David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L SEC.
L. & POL’Y 87, 98–100 (2010) (summarizing the applicability of the existing laws of war to
cyber warfare); Michael N. Schmitt, International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech
and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed, 54 HARVARD INT’L L.J. ONLINE 13, 15–18 (2012), http://
www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/HILJ-Online_54_Schmitt.pdf (discussing
the applicability of international law to cyberspace). Cyber conflict and international law is
also a topic of a special issue of the U.S. Naval War College’s journal, International Law
Studies. See Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo & Daria P. Wollschlaeger, Preface to 87 INT’L L.
STUD. xxiii, xxiv–xxvi (2011).
16
Randall Dipert authored the first article by an ethicist to address cyber warfare.
Dipert, supra note 3, at 394–95. Computer scientist Neil C. Rowe had earlier raised moral
concerns about cyber weapons and strategy. See id. at 394.
17
JOEL BRENNER, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE: INSIDE THE NEW THREAT MATRIX OF
DIGITAL ESPIONAGE, CRIME, AND WARFARE 137–47 (2011); RICHARD A. CLARK & ROBERT
K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 64–68 (2010).
18
Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, 35 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 5, 10–15
(2011).
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caused by conventional war.19 However, several recent conflicts, at least one of
which (Stuxnet) did cross the boundary defining an act of war, 20 have suggested
the emergence of increasingly shared norms by which such conflict can be
assessed, and perhaps constrained.
II. CODIFICATION OF EMERGENT NORMS
The final comment above illustrates an approach to understanding and
governing the future development and use of exotic military technologies first
suggested by Professor Gary Marchant et al.—namely, that rather than a rush
toward proposing unenforceable treaties or ineffectual bright-line statutes of blackletter international law, what is required is a form of governance known as soft
law.21 Professor Marchant and his co-authors invited those engaged in the
development and use of such technologies, in the course of their activities, to
reflect upon and observe what appear to them to be the boundaries of acceptable
and unacceptable conduct and to codify these boundaries by consensus and
agreement as the principles of best practice in their fields.
In many of the areas outlined above, emergent norms regarding ethics, legal
jurisdiction and compliance, and perhaps most importantly, appropriate degrees of
consent and accountability for all the stakeholders—that together constitute the
hallmarks of good governance—have already been largely established. What is
urgently needed at this juncture is a clear summary of the results of the discussions
and debates (such as those surveyed above) that would, in turn, codify what we
seem to have proposed or agreed upon in these matters, as distinguished from what
requires still further deliberation and attention.
In the case of the debate over autonomous systems, for example, I would
summarize the past several years of contentious debate in the following precepts,
which define good or best practices and address the limits of acceptable versus
unacceptable practices. I have already undertaken this task in the realm of cyber
conflict22 due to the reactions to several internationally acknowledged examples of
19
John Arquilla, Cyber War is Already Upon Us, FOREIGN POL’Y, http://www.foreign
policy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar_is_already_upon_us (last visited Mar. 5, 2013);
Thomas Rid, Think Again: Cyberwar, FOREIGN POL’Y, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
20
See SANGER, supra note 7, at 188–209; Lucas, supra note 7.
21
Marchant et al., supra note 14, at 306–14.
22
See Lucas, supra note 4 at 367–75. There I summarize from extant literature that
the use of a cyber weapon against an adversary is justified whenever there is a compelling
reason for doing so, when every reasonable effort toward resolution has been expended
with little likelihood of success, and when further delay will only make matters even worse.
See id. at 372–73. Resort to cyber conflict is only justified, moreover, when the weapon is
directed purely at military targets, the attack would inflict no more damage or loss of life
than is reasonably proportionate to the threat posed, and finally, every effort is made to
avoid or minimize harm to noncombatant lives or property. Id. In other respects, as noted
below, these precepts of cyber conflict are similar to, or can be straightforwardly derived
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cyber conflict that have recently occurred, from Estonia in 2007 to
Stuxnet/Operation Olympic Flame in 2010.23 The point of these exercises is not to
presume or preempt proper legislative authority, but instead to focus future
discussions upon whether such precepts are correctly stated (and if not, to modify
them accordingly), the extent to which they are in fact widely held, and finally, to
identify areas of omission that must still be addressed. This seems to me a far more
constructive enterprise at this point than further futile hand-wringing over the
ambiguities of moral discourse.
III. PRECEPTS FOR USE OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS
Law and moral discourse, famously, always lag behind technological
innovations—especially, if not exclusively, in warfare—and the innovations’
transformative impact on the cultures in which they arise. That does not mean that
law and morality are irrelevant and must be cast aside; neither does it require that
ethics always be portrayed as an impediment or obstacle to technological
development. Rather it demands, as such developments always have, that human
agents employ appropriate ingenuity in the framing of suitable metaphors, the
drawing of the most appropriate analogies, and reasoning by extrapolation from the
known to the unknown in the continuing quest to order and organize the perplexing
opportunities and risks that innovation and change otherwise invariably pose. In
that spirit, I offer these precepts as the emerging consensus on the use of
autonomous weapons systems.
Precept #1: The Principle of Mission Legality
A military mission that has been deemed legally permissible and morally
justifiable on all other relevant grounds does not lose this status solely on the basis
of a modification or change in the technological means used to carry it out (i.e., by
removing the pilot from the cockpit of the airframe or replacing the pilot with
demonstrably reliable software). However, this does not hold true if the technology
in question represents or employs weapons or methods that are already specifically
proscribed under existing international weapons conventions, is in violation of the
prohibitions in international humanitarian law against means or methods that inflict
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or is otherwise judged to constitute
means mala in se (i.e., evil in themselves).24
from, several of the precepts regarding the development and use of unmanned systems
discussed in this Article.
23
See supra note 7.
24
Wendell Wallach of Yale University, a well-respected ethicist, has recently
proposed that lethal autonomous systems, at least, should—like rape and biological
weapons—be classified among the means and methods of warfare that are mala in se. See
Wendall Wallach, Terminating the Terminator: What to Do About Autonomous Weapons,
SCI. PROGRESS (Jan. 29, 2013), http://scienceprogress.org/2013/01/terminating-the-termina
tor-what-to-do-about-autonomous-weapons. This position would render the argument
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Precept #2: The Principle of Unnecessary Risk25
Within the context of an otherwise lawful and morally justified international
armed conflict or domestic security operation, we owe the war-fighters or domestic
security agents every possible minimization of risk we can provide them in the
course of carrying out their otherwise legally permissible and morally justifiable
missions.
Precept #3: The Principle of the Moral Asymmetry of Adversaries26
By contrast, no such obligation is owed to opponents or adversaries during
such missions in their pursuit of presumably illegal and morally unjustifiable
activities. That is, there is no requirement of fairness or technological equality in
carrying out justified international armed conflict or lawful domestic security
operations. NATO/ISAF forces no longer owe combat parity or fairness to Taliban
and al-Qaeda operatives than domestic immigration and border security forces owe
such parity to armed agents of drug cartels. Both sets of adversaries are engaged in
virtually identical behavior: violation of domestic legal statutes and defiance of
duly elected legal authorities, indiscriminate targeting of civilians and destruction
of property, kidnapping, torture, execution, mutilation of prisoners, and so on.
Precept #4: The Principle of Greatest Proportional Compliance
Furthermore, in the pursuit of a legally permissible and morally justifiable
military or security mission, agents are obligated to use the means or methods
regarding mission legality with respect to the use of such technology moot. It is not at all
clear, however, that the reasons adduced for this classification are compelling in the case of
unmanned systems generally. Not only does the analogy between autonomous systems and
the examples of means mala in se given above not appear obvious, but Wallach’s argument
also rests on the largely discredited objection that machines cannot be held accountable for
their actions.
25
Bradley Jay Strawser, Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial
Vehicles, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 342, 343–49 (2010).
26
Note that this is not an explicit rejection of the doctrine of the “Moral Equality of
Combatants,” an essential element in what Michael Walzer defines as “the War
Convention.” See MICHAL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 34–37, 44–46 (1977). Rather, it is a repudiation of a
misplaced notion of fairness in combat, according to which it would be unfair for one side
in a conflict to possess or use weapons or military technologies that afforded them undue
advantage. This is sometimes cited in public as an objection to the use of drones in warfare.
It seems to equate war with a sporting competition, after the fashion of medieval jousting,
and upon examination, is not only patently ridiculous, but contradicted in most actual
armed conflicts of the past where maneuvering for technological superiority was a key
element in success. In any case, no such argument is made concerning legitimate domestic
security operations, as noted above, and does not obtain either within the realm of wars of
law enforcement or humanitarian intervention.
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available that promise the closest compliance with the international LOAC and
applicable ROEs, such as noncombatant distinction (i.e., discrimination) and the
economy of force (i.e., proportionality).
Precept #5: The Modified “Arkin Test”27
In keeping with Precept 4, an artifact (such as an autonomous unmanned
system) satisfies the requirements of international law and morality pertaining to
armed conflict or law enforcement and may therefore be lawfully used alongside or
substituted for human agents whenever the artifact can be shown to comply with
the relevant laws and ROEs as (or even more) reliably and consistently as human
agents under similar circumstances. Moreover, from application of Precepts 2 and
4 above, the use of such an artifact is not merely legally permissible but morally
required whenever its performance promises both reduced risk to human agents
and enhanced compliance with LOAC and ROEs.
Precept #6: The Principle of Nondelegation of Authority and Accountability28
The decision to attack an enemy (whether combatants or other targets) with
lethal force may not be delegated solely to an unmanned system in the absence of
human oversight, nor may eventual accountability for carrying out such an attack
be abrogated by human operators in the “kill chain.”
Precept #7: The Principle of Due Care
All research and development, design, and manufacturing of artifacts such as
lethally armed or autonomous unmanned systems that are ultimately intended for
use alongside, or in place of, human agents engaged in legally permissible and
morally justifiable armed conflict or domestic security operations must rigorously
comply with Precepts 1–5 above. All R&D, design, and manufacturing of
unmanned systems undertaken with full knowledge of, and in good faith
compliance with, the above precepts (with such good faith at minimum to
encompass rigorous testing to ensure safe and reliable operation under the terms of
these precepts) shall be understood as legally permissible and morally justifiable.
Precept #8: The Principle of Product Liability
Mistakes, errors, or malfunctions that nonetheless might reasonably and
randomly be expected to occur, despite the full and good faith exercise of due care
as defined in Precept 6 above, shall be accountable under applicable international
or domestic product liability law. Such accountability shall include full and fair
27

See Arkin, supra note 5, at 332–34.
This principle is indebted to the work of philosopher Robert Asaro of the New
School in New York City, cofounder of ICRAC.
28
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financial and other compensation or restitution for wrongful injury, death, or
destruction of property.
Precept #9: The Principle of Criminal Negligence
By contrast, R&D, design, or manufacturing of systems undertaken through
culpable ignorance or in deliberate or willful disregard of these precepts (including
failure to perform or attempts to falsify the results, tests regarding safety, reliability
of operation, or compliance with applicable law and ROEs, especially in the
aftermath of malfunctions as noted above) shall be subject to designation as war
crimes under international law, or as reckless endangerment or criminally
negligent behavior under the terms of applicable international or domestic law.
Individual parties to such negligence shall be punished to the full extent of the law,
to include trial and conviction in the International Criminal Court for the willful
commission of war crimes or civil and criminal prosecution within the appropriate
domestic jurisdiction for reckless endangerment or criminal negligence. In
domestic jurisdictions providing for capital punishment upon conviction for the
occurrence of such mishaps within that jurisdiction, such punishment shall be
deemed an appropriate form of accountability under the precepts above.
Precept #10: Benchmarking
Testing for safety and reliability of operation under the relevant precepts
above shall require advance determination of relevant quantitative benchmarks for
human performance under the conditions of anticipated use and shall require any
artifact produced or manufactured to meet or exceed these benchmarks.
Precept #11: Orientation and Legal Compliance
All individuals and organizations (including military services, industries, and
research laboratories) engaged in R&D, design, manufacturing, acquisition, or use
of unmanned systems for military purposes shall be required to attend an
orientation and legal compliance seminar of not less than eight hours on these
precepts, and upon its conclusion, to receive, sign, and duly file with appropriate
authorities a copy of these precepts as a precondition of their continued work.
Failure to comply shall render such individuals liable under the principle of
criminal liability (Precept 9) above for any phase of their work, including but not
limited to, accidents or malfunctions resulting in injury, death, or destruction of
property.
Government and military agencies involved in contracting for the design and
acquisition of such systems shall likewise require and sponsor this orientation
seminar and facilitate the deposit of the required signed precept form by any
contractors or contracting organizations receiving federal financial support for
their activities. Federal acquisitions and procurement officials shall also receive
this training and shall be obligated to include the relevant safety/reliability

2013] LEGAL & ETHICAL PRECEPTS OF EMERGING MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 1281
benchmarks of human performance along with other technical design
specifications established in RFPs or federal contracts.29
IV. CONCLUSION
My intent in offering these precepts is to suggest areas of consensus and
agreement discerned among contending stakeholders and positions in this debate,
and to suggest the norms emerging from this debate that might serve to guide (if
not strictly govern) the behavior of states, militaries, and those involved in the
development, testing, and manufacture of present and future unmanned systems. I
likewise believe that discussion of the meaning, application, and refinement of
these precepts as soft-law guidelines for proper use of unmanned systems would be
substantially more efficacious than further moral hand-wringing over their
potential risks, let alone rushing to legislation that would have both unenforceable
and unintended harmful consequences.
Some of the foregoing precepts are specific to military robotics (e.g., Precepts
5 & 6, pertaining to the Arkin test and prohibition on delegation of authority to
unmanned systems, respectively). This general approach, based upon mutual
consensus regarding emerging norms and many, if not most, of the precepts
elicited above, however, would prove useful by analogy as well in other areas of
technological development, such as nonlethal weapons, cyber warfare, projects for
“warrior enhancement,” and other military or domestic security technologies.
In the case of cyber conflict, for example, Precept 1 pertaining to mission
legality would likewise suggest that, in any situation in which a use of force was
otherwise deemed justifiable, that justification would extend to the use of cyber
weapons and tactics as well as to conventional weapons and tactics. Moreover, by
the Principle of Greatest Proportional Compliance (Precept 4 above), in an instance
in which the use of force was otherwise justifiable, given a choice of cyber versus
conventional weaponry, the use of the more discriminate and less destructive
weapon (presumably the cyber weapon) would not merely be permitted, but
obligatory. This principle also dictates the use of less-lethal (or nonlethal)
weaponry, when the effects otherwise achieved are equivalent.
In sum, I believe there is far more consensus among adversarial parties
arguing about ethics and law in such matters than we have heretofore been able to
discern. That emerging consensus, in turn, points toward a more productive regime
of governance and regulation to ensure against the risk of unintended harm and
consequences than do rival attempts at legal regulation or moral condemnation.
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A similar set of procedures (i.e., Precepts 10 and 11) is recommended for analogous
programs involving cyber weapons and tactics, nonlethal weapons, and human
enhancement projects (the last already to include compliance with relevant federal
requirements regarding research on human subjects).

